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Secretary of Defense Project 60 was inaugurated in 1962 to inves-
tigate and ascertain the possibility of unifying procurement contract admin-
istration and management under a common set of policy and procedural
rules. Historically, these functions had been conducted separately within
the several services and, more recently, in consolidated commodity pro-
curement centers managed by one of the services. Each military depart-
ment maintained redundant organizational elements consisting of regional
representatives or residents at major contractor facilities. Considerable
justification for a unification effort existed since the performance of pro-
curement contract administration functions within the departments and the
centers which they managed were governed by the requirements of the
Armed Services Procurement Regulations (ASPR) and common Department
of Defense (DOD) instructions. The ASPR requirements were imposed on
all defense contractors through their inclusion in applicable articles and
specifications in the procurement contracts and were administered by the
separate field organizations in accordance with the DOD instructions.
Within the purview of Project 60 was the area of procurement
quality assurance as it relates to contract management. A special

sub-group of the project force was formed to evaluate this area and to
consider the feasibility of establishing reasonable uniformity in procurement
quality assurance operations. That some consolidation was achievable in
this area was supported by the uniform applicability of ASPR, Chapter XIV,
Procurement Quality Assurance, and of the DOD 4355 series of instructions.
The level of operations for which uniformity was sought was not
specified to the Project 60 sub-group for quality assurance. Their investi-
gation, therefore, spanned systems, policies, procedures, and methodology
then in use by the several departments.
There did exist a diversity of procurement quality assurance pro-
cedures and methods among the field contract management organizations.
The quality assurance sub-group attributed the diversity to the separate
administration of each department's contracts by their own functional ele-
ments and to the issuance of individual implementing instructions which
supplemented DOD regulations and the ASPR quality assurance and inspection
articles. The implementing instructions, although founded on common
sources and not constituting deviations from the ASPR provisions or from
DOD instructions, did create variances in operating practices and multiple
administrative requirements for both contractor and governmental quality
assurance organizations.
The report reflected the effect of these implementation differences
on the members of the sub-group. This was evidenced by the degree of





formality and depth of control considered necessary in order to minimize
the differences in uniform policy application. The report recommended one
independent DOD agency charged with contract administration and containing
a procurement quality assurance element. Periodic quality management
audits of field activities by the proposed agency to ensure proper interpre-
tation and implementation were also recommended. For purposes of this
study, the most significant recommendation was that which encouraged the
preparation and promulgation of a Quality Assurance Manual which would be
directive in nature, permit no variation by field activities without approval,
contain specific procedural instructions for field effort in such areas as
statistical evaluations, product verification inspections, quality element
2
verifications, and establish minimum requirements for implementation.
The recommendation for such a manual was accepted and a commit-
tee for its preparation established under the counsel and guidance of the
Director of Quality Assurance and Reliability in the Office of the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Installations and Logistics. The committee con-
sisted of the most competent personnel available within the military depart-
ments and the newly formed Defense Supply Agency (DSA). Indeed, these
personnel were those responsible for their respective agency's quality
assurance programs. They were also those whose implementing instruc-







The manual was to become an appendix to the ASPR, Chapter XIV,
Procurement Quality Assurance. This document is commonly referred to
in the DOD as Appendix Q, a title which shall be adopted in this paper. The
committee began its deliberations on April 1, 1964. In its charter, the
committee was charged with the responsibility of producing a manual of
procurement quality assurance policies and procedures which would be
applicable, without detailed interpretation and implementation, to all types
of commodities. The manual was to be useful to Defense Department quality
verification effort regardless of military department or agency association.
By January 1, 1967, Appendix Q had not been promulgated, although
the general provisions of Chapter XIV had received a review and updating
and had been issued for broad guidance. Other recommendations of
Project 60 had proceeded on a timely basis. The proposed central DOD
agency for contract administration had been tested, established, organized,
and completely implemented by December 1, 1965, when the last Defense
Contract Administration Services Region began operations in Los Angeles,
California. The Defense Contract Administration Services (DCAS), as the
new agency was entitled, did not achieve full independence but was assigned
as an organizational unit of DSA. This event prevented its absorption of
the complete responsibility for DOD quality assurance. Excluded from its
Interview with George Brown, Assistant Director of Quality
Management, U.S. Naval Quality Assurance Office, Washington Navy Yard,
Washington, D.C., February 9, 1967.
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jurisdiction were the resident contract management organizations of the
military departments.
With the authority of the new DCAS agency thus delimited,
Appendix Q was made increasingly important to the consolidation of DOD
quality assurance. The coordinating document has not been promulgated
even though nearly four years have passed since Project 60 defined the
need for the manual and nearly three years have elapsed since the imple-
menting committee began its deliberation. Considering that such a delay
is excessive, the underlying question which this paper is intended to illu-
minate is why the formulation of the procedural document has not yet been
achieved.
The hypothesis of this paper is that the delay in publishing
Appendix Q is attributable to differences in the basic approaches to pro-
curement quality assurance which were found to be of unexpected depth and
diversity among the military departments and the DSA. To test this
hypothesis, the following study questions will be investigated:
1. What are the similarities and differences which exist in the
philosophies, policies, and procedures of departmental procurement
quality assurance?
2, What has been and is the effect of these similarities and
differences in achieving the announced intention of publishing a




As mentioned in Chapter I, the discussion of the first question is
limited to the concepts which developed within the Army, Navy, Air Force,
and Defense Supply Agency (DSA). It is recognized, however, that there do
exist several organizations having procurement quality assurance functions
that are beyond the purview of the Department of Defense (DOD) even though
the purchases of these organizations become part of the DOD equipment
inventory. These agencies include the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC),
the Defense Atomic Support Agency (DASA), and the National Aeronautics
and Space Administration (NASA). Since their operations are not subject to
DOD regulation, their procurement quality assurance functions are not dis-
cussed here.
The Navy Special Projects Office (SPO), responsible for all procure
ment functions attendant to the production and delivery of fleet ballistic mis-
siles, is another entity that enjoys a degree of autonomy in contract
administration. In its unique situation it does remain subject to DOD quality
assurance policy direction and Navy implementation. While SPO procedures
differ slightly from the basic Navy procedures, this office's requirement to
establish a special contract administration field office at the prime

contractor's plant had its origin in Navy quality assurance philosophy. For
these reasons, and the fact that the SPO was not excluded from accedence
to the proposed manual, their activities are not discussed separately.
Differing from the AEC and the DASA, NASA considers an extensive
field organization to be neither necessary nor desirable. Therefore, NASA
has relied heavily on DOD agencies to perform much of its quality assurance
activity. These operations, however, must be accomplished within require-
ments which are dictated by NASA and which reflect the unique stringency
of their procurements. These conditions must be accepted by the cognizant
inspection unit. Where the additional assurance cannot be gained by the
DOD organizations to the satisfaction of NASA officials, a separate field
office is established by NASA.
Pursuing the first question of this study, it seems reasonable to
expect that the underlying causes for different applications of common pol-
icy directives are founded on historical patterns of procurement quality
assurance. The trend of this historical development and the significant
events pertinent to the discussion are traced in the next succeeding chapters
for each of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and DSA procurement quality
assurance programs. In so doing, the major quality elements comprising
effort in each of the departments are identified. After collecting and iden-
tifying the elements of interest in Chapter VII, a comparison is made in
NPC 200-1A, Quality Assurance Provisions for Inspection Agen-
cies, prepared by NASA Reliability and Quality Assurance Office (Washington:
U.S. Government Printing Office, June, 1964).

Chapter VIII. At this point, the answers to the first study question are
discernible.
Accordingly, attention is directed to the second study question
concerning the effect of the variety of approaches on the achievement of a
standard quality assurance manual. Secretary of Defense Project 60 is
discussed in Chapter IX with emphasis on the recommendations for unifying
procurement quality assurance and developing a manual.
As the investigation of the effort to produce a standard manual
proceeds in Chapter X, less documented evidence is available. The reason
for this is due to the fact that minutes of the conferences on Appendix Q
were not maintained. The discussion, therefore, is validated by the oral
expressions of those personnel who direct, monitor, or are closely asso-
ciated with the production of Appendix Q, including several of the commit-
tee members.
The conclusions and recommendations in Chapter XI represent only
the opinions of the author. They are not attributable to any one individual
in the past or current employ of the Department of Defense, and should not
be associated thus, nor out of context.

CHAPTER III
HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF U.S. ARMY
QUALITY ASSURANCE
Advances in the concepts and practices of procurement quality
assurance were made only after the mathematicians and scientists of the
Bell Laboratories, in the mid-1920's, developed statistical methods and
theory. In 1931, W. A. Shewhart called attention to the validity of statis-
2
tical concepts in the control of manufacturing processes. It was not until
World War II that practical application of these concepts were attempted by
the military services. Previously, procurement quality assurance con-
sisted of 100 per cent inspection or an inspection based on a percentage of
total product. Early in the war the military departments realized that this
philosophy was incapable of inspecting and accepting increasing quantities
of material produced by numerous suppliers inexperienced in military
3
contracting.
John J. Riordan, "Protecting the Consumer Against Inferior
Quality, " Department of Defense Cost Reduction Journal, II, Issue 3 (Fall,
1966), p. 39.
2
Walter A. Shewhart, Economic Control of Quality of Manufactured






It was during this period that the Ordnance Department employed
a number of specialists, including some of those from the Bell Laboratories,
to pursue the development of statistical techniques. The effort was success-
ful and produced a variety of statistical sampling plans which could be used
on the specific types of commodities procured by that department. These
commodities were relatively simple in design and physically measurable.
They readily adapted to the new techniques provided that one critical
requirement was met: the inspection characteristics to which the plans
applied must be homogenous. This was ensured by issuing Standard Inspec-
tion Procedures which collected inspection characteristics into homogenous
groups. The remainder of the Army, however, continued to drive every
tank, truck and jeep, fly every aircraft, and expand its inspection forces
2
in proportion to the increase in product acceptance workload.
The decrease in inspection personnel which followed World War II
did not anticipate the advent of cold war nor the continued high level of
3
military purchasing. By 1953, therefore, statistical sampling had been
expanded to verify nearly all items produced for the Army. At the same







Interview with S. L. Lorber, Director, Quality Assurance




Secretary of Defense Project 60, op. cit .
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In the period 1953 through 1959, the need to place legal responsi-
bility upon the contractors was manifested in a variety of purchase descrip-
tions which included the requirement to initiate adequate systems for the
control of quality. These were followed by contractual requirements in the
form of a general specification. This effort culminated in April, 1959,
with the issuance of a coordinated quality control system requirement for
2
inclusion in military contracts.
Historically, the Army, its sister services, and industry had
accepted the inference that responsibility for product quality was vested in
the acceptance authority of the military field inspection organizations. With
the application of the new requirement to more complex products, such as
missiles and highly sensitive electronic communication and detection
devices, it became apparent that statiscal procurement quality assurance
concepts were inadequate to evaluate the adequacy with which industry car-
3
ried out its quality control responsibilities.
In defining what constituted adequacy, the criteria chosen were
based on a contractor controlling his product quality well enough to allow a
reduction in the magnitude of Army inspection required for product
Specification MILj-G- 14461, General Quality Control Requirements
for Ordnance Material (January, 1957).
2
Specification MIL -Q
-9858, Quality Control Systems Requirements
(April, 1959).
3
Interview with S. J. Solt, Director, Quality Management Branch
Department of the Navy Quality Assurance Office, November 8, 1966.
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acceptance. In the Ordnance Corps, this guidance was developed, in the
traditional statistical manner, into a mathematical procedure. It was used
to determine the validity of a contractor's report of inspection characteristic
2
acceptance. The Ballistic Missile Agency found statistical approaches
inappropriate to reduction in procurement quality assurance of Redstone
and Jupiter missiles. This resulted in a study, undertaken by the Ordnance
Corps in 1957, to develop an approach to the verification of contractor qual-
ity assurance performance on high dollar value, low volume, highly complex
products. The study was later expanded to encompass all policy and proce-
dure in the Corps, including the statistical concepts that governed acceptance
of high volume, low dollar value, non-complex products. The philosophy of
using contractor -gene rated objective quality evidence to evaluate performance
was developed. After the reorganization of 1962, the Ordnance Corps docu-
ments which reflected this concept were promulgated as the Army Quality
Assurance Program.
Underlying the Army Quality Assurance Program is the Ordnance
Corps tradition of physical handling of the product during performance of
Standard Inspection Procedures for acceptance. The policies and procedures
Army Regulation 715-20, Procurement Inspection and Quality
Control (April 15, 1955).
2DOD Handbook H-109, Statistical Procedures for Determining
Validity of Supplier's Attributes Inspection (Office of the Assistant Secretary
of Defense, Supplies and Logistics), May 6, I960.
3AMCR 715-508 and 715-509, Inspection Administrative Manual and
Quality Assurance Technical Procedures.
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indicate that more emphasis on this function is expected of field quality
assurance representatives than on any other function. The attitude is best
expressed, perhaps, by the following quotation:
Quality is measurable only at the final user's level when he unpack-
ages a product and prepares it for use. The inspector may be the last
man to see that material who is capable of adjudging its ability to per-
form its intended use. *
This concept pervades the implementation of the Army procurement
quality assurance program. It has contributed to another deeply entrenched
philosophy which dictates that each inspector shall be independently capable
of performing every inspection and test required to verify the product func-
2
tion. This idea prevails even when the complexities of the equipment
which tests the functional performance of the product requires more highly
skilled and specially trained contractor technicians. While there are
instances where the Army inspector is allowed to witness an intricate test
procedure conducted by contractor personnel, the inspector is warned that
3
such witnessing is least likely to assure the product. The increase in
necessary witnessing operations has led to the establishment of test equip-
ment verification laboratories within affected Army technical commands to
aid the field inspector in evaluating the quality of the product by verifying the
test equipment used to accept it.
3AMCR 715-509, Quality Assurance Technical Procedures,
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Contractual techniques have been developed which also aid in
verifying the adequacy of a contractor's sytem for controlling quality. It is
a prime requisite that the first production models be independently tested
and dissected at arsenals, proving grounds, or separately contracted private
laboratories before production for delivery is authorized. Exceptions have
occurred because of political, budgetary, or time restraints, but the valida-
tion is not pre-empted. It is conducted concurrent with the first of similar
periodic tests which are made on samples as they are produced throughout
the life of the contract. Important to this concept is that this verification is
done without reference to contractor inspection procedures or to the
Standard Inspection Procedures. The evaluation is made devoid of prior
considerations and governed only by the requirements of the contract.
The emphasis on verification of the actual end product does not
preclude the attempt to predetermine and monitor the adequacy of a con-
tractor's quality system. This is accomplished by several means, the first
of which is the performance of a survey which investigates the quality sys-
tem existent and planned for a commodity prior to the issue of a contractual
award. The pre -award survey includes past performances on military pro-
curements but relies more heavily on the studied familiarity of the investi-
gators with the item to be produced. A successful survey hinges on the
purported ability to accurately and adequately apply quality techniques and





procedures to the design and production peculiarities of the particular prod-
uct. The assigned field activity carries on the continual redetermination
of the producer' 8 quality system through the monitoring of actual practices
and of all the documentation which supports the assurance of quality in the
end product.
The deemphasis of contractor quality systems observation arises
from the philosophy that it is least likely to assure the product. Coupled
with proximity to the product, this reason is responsible for field inspector
determination of what characteristics need to be inspected. The Standard
Inspection Procedures and Quality Assurance Plans are subject to approval
by the next higher echelon of inspection, usually the quality assurance
section of a technical office.
Complex supplies containing quality characteristics which became
unverifiable beyond a certain stage of assembly induced a requirement for
in-process inspection. The introduction of customer validation of sub-
components adapted existing statistical sampling methods to a product
acceptance structure which tolerates considerable variability. This approach
is valid until parametric tolerances require verification at earlier levels of
the production process, but this contingency generally is not characteristic
of Army procurements.
In-process inspection was the procedure adopted for control of
certain supplies which were subcontracted. The extent to which product
verification is conducted at the place of manufacture depends on the degree
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to which important quality characteristics became unverifiable upon receipt
at the final production facility. Source inspection operations of this kind
were delegated to regional representatives of the same commodity command
until the 1962 reorganization. Presently, combined regional procurement
districts perform this function with advice from cognizant technical com-
mands or as determined from the Standard Inspection Procedures.
A certain amount of discrepant material may occur in any produc-
tion process. Inasmuch as some of these non-conformant items are usable
or repairable, it is in the interest of the procuring agency to consider
acceptance of such material in order to limit the ultimate procurement costs,
If the contractor is the design agent and technical representation by the
procuring agency is readily available, Army policy allows the establishment
of a non -conforming material review board. If not established by the
Standard Inspection Procedures, these boards determine the criticality of
the defective characteristics and have authority to disposition the items. It
is rare to accept defects which have major effects on the product's function
but common to accept those of a minor nature. This depends upon the type
of contract, product mission, nature of the production processes and tech-
niques, and the ability of the representative.
In all cases where characteristics have major effects on the prod-
ucts, the Army's formal waiver procedure prevails. This procedure
requires the concurrence of the field quality assurance agent, the technical
agency, and the contracting officer. The process ensures that incremental
q dfll
.•:
i 3ij s t«^
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changes do not have interfacial detriment and that cost adjustments are
realized.
The role of the "Key Inspection" organization is pertinent to the
overall quality program. These units developed within the commodity com-
mands as a coordinative element among the regional and resident representa-
tives and presently function in a similar capacity for the technical commands.
Very much product -oriented, the key inspectors had authority to review
any and all aspects of the Army effort only. As the emphasis for quality
assurance responsibility shifted to contractors, the key inspection role
expanded and is now able to approach the producers as independent audit
agencies. The authority to review does not imply the authority to direct.
Nonetheless, key inspection recommendations encourage reevaluation and
adjustment of procedures at all levels.

CHAPTER IV
HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF U.S. NAVY
QUALITY ASSURANCE
The Navy recognized in World War I that its technical bureaus had
practiced material and personnel competition which was motivated by the
urgency of military procurement. Additionally, the department recognized
that inefficiency occurred when two or more bureaus conducted concurrent
procurement quality assurance operations in the same facility, inspecting
the same material to substantially the same characteristics using the same
general plan of 100 per cent inspection. Accordingly, in 1927, the Navy
combined the separate inspection forces maintained by the Bureaus of
Aeronautics, Ordnance, Engineering, Hull and Yards and Docks into the
Material Inspection Service, U.S. Navy. Underlying this reorganization
was the fundamental belief that a qualified inspector can satisfactorily
inspect and accept material in compliance with contract and technical
requirements regardless of the identification of procurement agency or
ultimate user.
Ralph M. Lockhart, 'Material Inspection and Quality Control
Within the Department of Defense" (unpublished Master's thesis, ICAF,




The organization of the Material Inspection Service does allow for
special, highly technical items of production to be administered by the
responsible technical bureau or agency when resident surveillance is con-
sidered necessary. Product assurance is not a controlling factor in deter-
mining the need for residence, however. That decision is based on technical
design and coordination control, high dollar value, or security requirements.
For this reason, even sub-bureau level resident representation is tolerated.
Examples are the Bureau of Naval Weapons Special Project Office procure-
ments of fleet ballistic missiles and the Bureau of Ships nuclear propulsion
program. An attempt to coordinate overall procurement quality assurance
policy for both specialized and generalized administration was made by
creating an inspection section with broad directive authority in the Office of
Naval Material.
Quality assurance consisting of 100 per cent inspection or straight
percentage sampling remained the basis for material acceptance until 1943
when, collaborating with the Army Ordnance Department efforts, the Navy's
Bureau of Ordnance embarked on a program to develop and apply statistical
sampling plans. The Navy's effort was directed more toward the applica-
tion of statistical quality control techniques to manufacturing operations in
its own Naval Ordnance Plants than to improvement in procurement quality
2




J. J. Riordan, "Protecting the Consumer Against Inferior




validity of sampling techniques than was apparent in the Army endeavor.
The Navy focused on those product characteristics that needed greatest con-
trol. From this attention to comparative need evolved the procedure of
classifying potential defects by categories of effect upon material safety,
function, life, and interchangeability. The classification of defects made




Before the end of World War II, Standard Sampling Inspection Pro-
cedures were used by the Navy wherever products were submitted in lots
and consisted of characteristics which could be classified as defective or
non -defective. Such characteristics were defined as attributes of inspection.
These sampling procedures were assembled into attribute inspection tables
in 1946 and became a contract requirement for manufacturers and Navy
4inspectors in determining the acceptability of material. By 1950, modified
5
tables of the same basic design were required by all military departments.
Influenced primarily by the work of E. Li. Grant, the Navy Depart-
ment continued its pursuit of a general statistical quality control program
Office of Naval Material Instruction 5000. 3, Material Inspection
Service, U.S. Navy Administration Manual, II, Ch. 7.
Rxordan, op. cit
.
Secretary of Defense Project 60, op. cit.
4Navy General Specifications for Inspection of Material, Appendix X
(Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, April 1, 1946).
5
Specification MIL -STD- 105A, Sampling Procedures and Tables for
Inspection by Attributes (September 11, 1950).
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during the early 1950's. The objective was the development of a coordinated
inspection procedure from machine and process levels through final
acceptance based on statistical principles which would maximize the assur-
ance that a minimum of unacceptable material was produced. The effort
was supported by the fundamental belief that product inspection was more
vital to material quality than observation of contractor quality systems and
procedures.
The statistical emphasis of the Navy's procurement quality assur-
ance program remains strong today but it has lost its dominant role. In
the middle and late 1950's, two major factors contributed to this shift in
approach. One of these was the increasing conviction that the contractor
must be made responsible for his own product quality. The other was the
attempt by the Navy to maintain purity in statistical sampling for acceptance
and for machine and process control. However, valid statistical methods
required more manpower than was available. Their application shifted,
therefore, to use in determining the adequacy of a contractor's quality con-
trol system. In substance, valid statistical inspection planning was
required of producers and implemented systems were evaluated accordingly.
This approach had the effect of paying the contractor to do what the Navy
inspection organization would have done had it had the manpower and, at the
Eugene L. Grant, Statistical Quality Control (New York; McGraw-
Hill, 1946).
2
Interview with S. G. Hamner, Head, Quality Assurance Branch,
Office of Naval Material, January 26, 1967.
. t '
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same time, began to shift the emphasis for product quality responsibility.
The task of the Navy inspector now appeared to be redundant. The
verification process, therefore, was redesigned. The new definition
retained its product orientation but included contractor records of statistical
inspection results which were reviewed by the inspector and appraised in
relation to his own product verification results. Thus, the adequacy of the
contractor's system was inferred from product inspection. The mathemat-
ical mechanics of the comparison included only one level of inspection
reduction.
The statistical approach to quality assurance remained limited to
products whose acceptability was definable in terms of defective or non-
3
defective attributes. After further study, the classification of defects con-
cept was combined with the requirement to perform customer inspection
during production at component and sub-assembly levels. With some com-
promise in its purity, the statistical method was applied to complex products
such as missiles, radars, and computers. The method did not suffice for
4
inferring the quality of assembly in ships and aircraft, however.
Interview with Dr. W. A. Pabst, Chief Statistician, Naval Air
Systems Command, Washington, D.C., October 17, 1966.
2
Office of Naval Material Instruction 4355. 35, POD Procurement
Inspection Policies and Procedures for Items Covered by Military and Federal
Specifications (November 18, .1957).
3NAVORD OSTD 78, Ordnance Standard for Ordnance Classification
of Defects (1951).
4
Office of Naval Material Instruction 4355. 40, POD Policies and
Procedures for Assuring the Production of Complex Supplies and
Equipment (April 3, 1959).

23
The Bureaus of Ships and Aeronautics accepted its products on the
basis of their ability to adequately specify functional performance require-
ments in the contract and to devise suitable trials and tests which would
demonstrate the successful accomplishment of those functions. The pro-
curement of ship construction material, the fabrication of its hull and the
fitting of its equipment was verified in terms of military specifications for
material and approved blueprints. Rejection authority rested on the docu-
mentation referenced in the contract. For this reason, much effort has
been expended by the Bureau of Ships in establishing standards for processes
related to ship construction such as welding, riveting, pipe fitting, and
electrical soldering. These standards were inserted into contracts as an
aid to assuring the quality of the final product. In addition to this procedure,
warranty is a major element in the control and evaluation of a contractor's
quality assurence system.
The test pilot is the ultimate procurement quality assurance repre-
sentative for aircraft. His recommendations concerning acceptance trials
and tests are final and authoritative. With the increasing complexity of these
systems and the accompanying delicacy and density of aircraft accouterments,
inspection on the production line was instituted. This effort is called quality
assurance but is primarily a matter of ensuring that critical steps in the
assembly process are not overlooked, particularly if the step becomes




unverifiabie at higher assembly levels. For this reason, inspectors of naval
aircraft take maximum advantage of contractor-generated records and
detailed assembly prints in performing their function. Inspection of this
type has not required the sophistication characteristic of large volume,
statistical, acceptance procedures but such techniques are applied to
subassembly material and equipments.
After adoption of the DOD requirement for contractor quality con-
trol and inspection systems in 1959, the Navy retained its contractor record
and product verification approach to evaluation. Observation of contractor
policies and procedures was not endorsed to the field leve until promulga-
tion of a DOD evaluation handbook which provided a check-off list of supplier
2
quality control elements. These elements were modified to emphasize the
employment of objective quality evidence. The resulting check-off lists,
entitled FORM NAVEXOs 43 55/7, were used in the monitoring efforts of all
3
units of the Material Inspection Service. The frequency of monitoring
actions was defined only by the Bureau of Naval Weapons, which, at the
time, included aircraft procurements. They were to be conducted upon
Interview with F. R. Sheehan, Assistant Head, Quality Assurance
Branch, Office of Naval Material, Washington, D.C., January 26, 1967.
2DOD Handbook H-110, Evaluation of Contractor Quality Control
Systems (October 31, I960). This manual is obsolete and has been replaced
by DOD Handbook H50. The latter no longer contains check-off lists but
FORM NAVEXOs 4355/7 are still effective.
3
Office of Naval Material Instruction 5000. 3, Material Inspection
Service, U.S. Navy, II, Chapt. 7, pp. 7-19.
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commencement of a new procurement, upon major change in the contractor's
system, and at such other times as deemed necessary by the Navy's quality
assurance representative. This definition applied only to specialized
offices of the Material Inspection Services under the cognizance of that
Bureau. The Bureau of Ships developed special teams for shipyard evalua-
tions and utilized a set of special quality elements that characterized naval
2
construction.
It is important to note at this point that, historically, the Navy has
steadfastly refused to approve contractor systems for quality assurance
3
regardless of evaluation results. Since the contractual vehicles advise a
producer that his plan is subject to disapproval and does not discuss
approval, the Navy has maintained this position and is not expected to
4
change.
Broad guidance is for individual determinations of the need for
5inspection at vendor and subcontractor plants. Decisions are made by
contracting officers on the basis of availability of objective quality evidence
Bureau of Naval Weapons Instruction 4330. 12, Bureau of Naval
Weapons Representatives Field Administration Manual (1962), para. 107131.
2





Office of Naval Material Instruction 5000. 3, op. cit.
, pp. 7-14.
4
Interview with H. P. Sullivan, Head, Quality Assurance Section,
Naval Ordnance Systems Command (formerly Bureau of Naval Weapons),
November 18, 1966.
5
Office of Naval Material Instruction 5000. 3, op. cit. , pp. 7-6/7.
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and of special inspection equipment which will enable the prime contractor
and the Navy inspectors to verify reported results. The guidance has been
loosely interpreted because of the geographic convenience of Material
Inspection Service offices. Later, more critical review of the requirements
was undertaken in order to minimize overall procurement quality assurance
costs. The result was an increase in prices bid for contracts which antici-
pated great reductions in government source inspections.
Control of nonconforming material took several forms. The original
concept granted blanket authority for acceptance of minor defects to individual
inspectors unless specifically withheld by the contracting agency. The
Bureau of Ships did withhold this authority at the inspector level but retained
it in the person of the Supervisor of Shipbuilding in residence at the ship-
2
yards. Nonconforming material control was strengthened by the classifica-
tion of defects system which removed the burden of determining the critical -
ity of defectiveness observed. Using this system, the generalized offices
had no difficulty in dispositioning non-conforming material. Consolidation
of the Bureau of Ordnance and Aeronautics resulted in a policy which dele-
gated to plant representatives the authority to accept defects which did not
affect safety, compatibility, performance, weight, service life,
Interview with Sullivan, February 6, 1966.
2
Secretary of Defense Project 60, op. cit. , p. 136.
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interchangeability, and reliability and did not require a change in the con-
tractual scope of work. This was necessiated by the lack of classification
of defects in the aircraft industry, but it opened the door for local acceptance
of material which could have greater than minor effects in areas not speci-
2
fied. The implication has been recognized but has not been rescinded.
Significant in the Navy control of non -conforming material is the
establishment of waiver policy by each technical agency. Waivers require
procurement agency concurrence and pertain only to levels of non-
conformance not authorized for disposition by local quality assurance
representatives. They are carefully avoided by manufacturers since there
are no requirements to advise procurement or technical agencies of disposi-
tions made within the purview of the field activity. Exceptions do exist,
however, in the procurements of fleet ballistic missiles and nuclear
propulsion equipment.
Bureau of Naval Weapons Instruction 4355. 12, Sec. 10, Air Force
and Bureau of Naval Aeronautics Policy for Material Review (February,
I960), redesignated from Bu. Aer. Inst. 4355.11, Sup. 1, October, 1955.
2
Interview with Sullivan, November 18, 1966.

CHAPTER V
HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF U.S. AIR FORCE
QUALITY ASSURANCE
In the years preceding World War II, military aircraft procurement
was considerably different from today's predetermination of requirements
and subsequent invitations to industry for production bids. Then, a manu-
facturer produced an aircraft and invited the Army Air Corps to consider it
for military adaptation. If the proposed vehicle was determined feasible for
use, only then did the contractor and Air Corps personnel discuss the terms
of procurement and the administration of the contract. Because of the
relatively small amount of such procurement, the consequent small number
of field personnel and the existence of production models, the Air Corps had
practically no organized inspection program and no formal procedures for
test and acceptance of material. It was left to the senior inspection repre-
sentative to determine the amount and type of quality assurance needed in a
particular situation. Their determinations were hardware oriented with
little or no reliance being placed on contractor efforts, even though inspec-
2
tion organizations did exist in aircraft manufacturing plants.
Interview with R. P. Hussey, Director, Procurement Policy,
Air Force Systems Command, Washington, D.C. , January 25, 1967.
2




The rapid expansion of aircraft production during World War II and
the problems of mass-producing hitherto handcrafted machines caused
industry to recognize the need for formal organization of its own inspection
programs. The Air Corps chose to rely on the contractor inspection effort
because of limited personnel and, instead of duplicating their effort, devel-
oped a type of work sampling called spot checking.
Performing under contract from the Army Air Corps, a University
of Stanford study recommended that military procurement policy should
2
require a contractor to be contractually responsible for product quality.
The recommendation resulted in a specification which was incorporated into
most material procurement contracts. It defined basic management and
technical parameters for the control of quality by contractors without dis-
3
tinguishing between complex and non-complex materials.
Paralleling this emphasis on producer quality responsibility, the
Air Corps developed its spot -check technique into what is described vari-
ously as system inspection, procedure verification, or surveillance.
Procurement Quality Control Manual 74-1 distinguished between field opera-




Stanford Research Institute, The Inspection Function of the United
States Air Force ( 1 949)
.
3
Specification MIL -Q -5923, Quality Control System Requirements
(1950). Now obsolete; replaced by MIL.-Q-9858 in 1959.
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checking of hardware. Indirect methods addressed raw materials, processes*
tools, cleanliness, test equipments, calibration, documentation, and the
contractor's procedures for the control of these contributors to the quality
of end products. Underlying this type of inspection effort was the premise
that if these controls were adequate, the quality of the product would be
satisfactory and the product would be acceptable.
The Air Corps recognized the value of the statistical methods for
sampling and process control and encouraged its use by contractors. These
methods were extensively employed by manufacturers but they were not
2
used to significant extent by the customer representatives.
The Department of the Air Force evolved from a technical com-
modity command of the Army which maintained a separate quality assurance
organization. Asa result of not dividing itself into Corps or Bureaus, the
entire inspection organization was transferred into one branch of the Air
Material Command, now called the Air Force Systems Command. In so
doing, the coordination for procurement quality assurance remained
centralized and policies and procedures developed before were not lost in
3
the transition.
Between 1949 and 1959, the Air Force directed its attention to
refining consumer -supplier relations in an environment where the contractual
Interview with R. P. Hussey, January 25, 1967.
2






burden of final product quality responsibility was upon the contractor.
During this period, the Air Force developed the procedure of taking fifty
quality element observations within a seven-day period at each inspection
station within a contractor's plant. Inspection stations were determined by
the field representative. Observations were defined broadly to include both
direct and indirect inspection of the procurement quality assurance elements.
These elements were also established by the local representative within the
2
guidelines of contract specifications and the quality assurance manual. This
procedure constituted the Air Force continuous audit program. It also
defined a minimum quality assurance effort independent of the volume of
product being produced. This was a departure from Army and Navy mini-
3
mal effort which was a function of product quantity.
Whereas the Air Force specification of quality control requirements
for contractors had not distinguished between complex and non -complex
material, the superseding DOD specification limited itself to complex pro-
curements. This left a gap in Air Force non-complex procurements of
petroleum products, textiles, etc. , and implied the increased use of indirect
techniques in evaluating contractor quality control systems employed in





Air Force Systems Command Manual 74-1, Procurement Quality
Control Manual, Chapters III and V, August 22, 1962.
3




the production of its complex aircraft weapons systems. Inasmuch as the
ratio of direct to indirect inspections was not specified and personnel levels
were not commensurate with the growth in material purchasing levels,
indirect methods became paramount in field agency operations. Direct
product verification was reduced drastically except in ballistic missile pro-
duction where field representation as compared to product volume was
maintained at a relatively high ratio.
The absence of contractual vehicles for application on procurements
of non-complex items resulted in Air Force support for the Army's develop-
ment of a suitable DOD specification. The resultant document was a deriva-
tive of the previous specification and defined the contract requirement as one
of physical product verification and general inspection rather than an inte-
2
grated quality assurance system. The introduction of this document enabled
continuance of established Air Force surveillance methods, but did imply an
3increase in the use of direct inspection procedures.
The nature of Air Force procurements anticipates ultimate techno-
logical obsolescence and minimizes the probability of reprocuring identical
equipment. This influence tends to direct high-dollar-value contracts to
those manufacturers having better than average reputations for reliable
Interview with Hussey, op. cit .
2
Specification MIL-I-45208, Military Inspection Requirements
(December 29, I960).
3




contract performance. This feature has supported the concept of purchasing
complex product design as well as the material. In effect, the contractor's
quality control system is also purchased after an initial pre -award survey
establishes the general acceptability of organization, policies, and proce-
dures designed to perform the quality function. This practice accredits the
policy of performing only sufficient surveillance to ensure that the con-
tractor does what he agreed to do in the contract. On this point, the Ballis-
tic Missile Division has inserted a contract provision, Exhibit 80, which
substituted contractor verification and quarterly reports for resident Air
Force quality assurance representation. The cost comparisons, however,
2
were inconclusive and the pursuit of this idea was abandoned.
The philosophy of purchasing quality assurance from reliable con-
tractors pervades Air Force spare parts procurements and efforts to control
subcontracted supplies. The prime contractor is ultimately responsible for
that control and his performance in this area is evaluated by occasional visits
to vendor plants and source acceptance of material destined for military
3
owned and operated assembly and repair units.
Notwithstanding the efforts of a reliable contractor and the quality
assurance representative, nonconforming material is created. Disposition
Interview with S. J. Solt, member, Defense Contract Management
Review Committee, Washington, D. C. , October 21, 1966.
2
Interview with Sheehan, op. cit. Confirmed in telephone conver-
sation with R. P. Hussey, February 2, 1967.
3






of such items is delegated to the field organizations within the restrictions
of the contract and the requirement that the defects do not affect safety,
performance, interchangeability, and contractually specified reliability.
Since the Air Force has not established comprehensive classifications of
defects, there does not exist a predetermined guide to criticality of defective
items. This is an engineering judgment made most often by contractor per-
sonnel inasmuch as the contractor normally retains design authority. Pro-
cedures for waiver of requirements and acceptance of those discrepant
materials withheld from field disposition is subject to the direction of the
procuring agency. The field agency remains responsible for reviewing the
volume and type of nonconformant items. It is not required, however, to
report the promptness nor adequacy of action taken to prevent recurrence
of the discrepancies. This condition exists even though the object of con-
2
trolling nonconforming material is to correct the cause of its production.
In point of clarity, it should be noted that a concept did develop for
classifying product characteristics. Their design and use differed from
classification of defects in that these characteristics were to benefit con-
tractor engineering personnel in determining realistic reliability and
3
maintainability objectives.
Ibid. , Chapter XIV, originally established in U.S. Air Force Speci
fication Bulletin NR 515, Control of Non-conforming Supplies , Nov. 3, 1959.
2
Interview with Hussey, January 25, 1967.
3
Air Force Systems Command Regulation 74-5, Quality Control
Program for Ballistic Missiles and Space Systems (March 27, 1961).

CHAPTER VI
HISTORICAL. DEVELOPMENT OF DEFENSE SUPPLY
AGENCY QUALITY ASSURANCE
The Defense Supply Agency (DSA) has existed as an organizational
entity only since November, 1961. It has developed, however, certain
characteristics of its quality assurance function which are pertinent to the
questions addressed by this paper.
A DOD-wide organization which would provide guidance and criteria
for procurement quality assurance operations throughout the several mili-
tary services was supported by the Second Hoover Commission. It recom-
mended consolidation of this effort and coordination of contractor and
2
customer product validation requirements. These recommendations were
considered necessary in spite of existing DOD directives which predated
3
the commission's report. Implementation of directives had been slow.
Some agreement had been achieved regarding interchange of inspection
DOD Directive 5105. 22, Defense Supply Agency (November 6,
1961).
2Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Gov-




3DOD Directive 4155. 6, POP Quality Assurance Concept and Policy
(April 14, 1954) and DOD Directive 4155. 3, DOD Procurement Inspection




services in plants having resident representatives. Coordinated effort also
produced the contractual requirements for contractor product quality respon-
sibility.
2
After the appointment of Robert S. McNamara as Secretary of
Defense, a series of DOD Directives were published which established a
single service procurement manager for some of the material common to all
3
the military departments. The service managers continued to employ pro-
curement quality assurance policies and procedures characteristic of their
respective military departments. The establishrr ent of DSA rapidly fol-
lowed. Each service manager became a commodity supply center for the
new organization in addition to five newly formed Defense Supply Centers.
The existing field activities which had performed inspection functions for
the single managers in areas of clothing and textiles, subsistence and general
supply were consolidated to form eight new Defense Supply Agency Procure-
ment Support Offices. Two regional sub-offices were formed solely for the
administration of constructional lumber procurements. The remaining
Defense Supply Centers negotiated new inspection interchange agreements
Army Regulation 410-6-58, Inspection Interchange Agreements
(Nov., 1953); Air Materiel Command Regulation 74-14, Interchange of Inspec-
tion Services (June, I960); and Office of Naval Material Instruction 4355. 6,
Interchange of Inspection Services among Procurement Inspection Activities ,
(August, I960).
Specification MIL-Q-9858, op. cit. ; and Specification MIL-I-45208,
op. cit .
3DOD Directives 5160. 16, 5160.11, 5160.36, and 5160. 31, Single
Manager Assignments for Medical, Subsistence, Construction and Industrial
Supplies
,
(April, 1961; October, 1961; August, 196 1; and August, 1961).
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with existing military organizations. Effectively, therefore, the new DSA
relied on a continuation of procurement quality assurance philosophies and
policies effective at the time of reorganization.
The agency was assigned responsibility for the quality of procure-
ments under its cognizance, for the action appropriate to that assurance,
and for the conduct of product acceptance in accordance with contractual
2
quality specifications. To carry out these responsibilities on a consolidated
basis, the formulation of a DSA procurement quality assurance manual was
undertaken. Prior to its promulgation, however, the recommendations of
Secretary of Defense Project 60 were implemented and the Defense Contract
Administration Service (DCAS) was assigned as an organizational unit of the
DSA.
The new DCAS organization combined regional contract administra-
tion agencies of the military services excepting certain resident representa-
tives situated at key industrial facilities. It also exempted a few specific
types of contracts such as those of the Army Corps of Engineers and the
Navy Civil Engineering Corps which purchased military construction. With
these few exceptions, the agency assumed the procurement quality assurance
3
functions for all Defense Supply Centers and their field activities.
Secretary of Defense Project 60, op. cit. , pp. 65, 66, and 163.
2DOD Directive 5105.22, Defense Supply Agency (November 6, 1961).
3
Department of Defense, An Introduction to the DSA ( .Vashington:
Government Printing Office, 1966), pp. 4 and 36.
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This greatly expanded responsibility for product quality contributed
to the delay and extensive review of the anticipated manual. Some new poli-
cies were introduced into this review. One was that the customer should
refrain from actions of any kind that might affect the contractual relationship
between the prime contractor and his vendors. This policy was designed to
prevent the implication that Defense inspection of subcontracted supplies
constituted prior acceptance of a portion of the end product. Such inspection
was interpreted as relieving the prime contractor from requirements to con-
trol the quality of that portion of his purchased components. Another concept
of the review was that the procurement agency, although empowered by the
Armed Services Procurement Regulations to direct what shall be verified,
had no authority concerning the means of verification. How this function
was performed was the responsibility of the DSA. A third element of con-
sideration was that DSA field representatives should not interpret instruc-
tions received from the procurement agency without approval of contracting
officers. This was necessary in order to ensure adequate control over
widely dispersed resident and itinerant representatives and to prevent inad-
vertent and unauthorized effects on contractual scope of work.
The resultant document did reflect the influence of these philoso-
phies. Purchased supplies are reiterated to be the responsibility of the
prime contractor. Provision is made for verification of contractor controls
Interview with Donald T. Vining, Head, Quality Plans and Policy,
DSA, Washington, D.C., February 9, 1967.
lo .
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over his vendors. These evaluations do not include physical product inspec-
tion or acceptance procedures except in tho ,e cases where the product is
shipped directly to a DOD using activity or where the procuring agency
requires product verification.
Control of a field representative's ability to affect contractual rela-
tionships rests on the integrity of the individual and on the abundant exhibition
of the dangers involved which are expressed throughout the manual. In addi-
tion, the representative is not authorized to disposition nonconforming mate-
rial of any classification except as specifically directed. A purchasing
office may delegate authority to accept minor discrepancies to the responsible
Contract Administration Office and, in this manner, make disposition
authority more accessible to the field inspector. In unusual circumstances
where technical advice from the purchasing agency is readily available, a
board for the review of nonconforming material may be established. In such
cases, the on-site quality assurance representative participates in the deci-
sions affecting defective material. It is emphasized, however, that respon-
sibility for changing the contract cannot be delegated by the procuring agent
2
and that acceptance of nonconforming material is a type of contract change.
The determination of what methods shall be used to verify the quality
of a product is within the purview of the field Defense inspector after having
Defense Supply Agency Manual 3200. 1, Procurement Quality




, p. 2, and Sec. V, Parti.
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performed the mandatory functions directed by the purchasing office. He is
guided by an amalgam of techniques developed by the military services.
These include the ratio and skip-lot statistical sampling plans and first arti-
cle procedures of the Army, the classification of defects system of the
Navy, and the contractor decision verification and system element evaluation
techniques of the Air Force.
Policy in DSA product verification has been affected by the tendency
of major military purchasers of identical items to issue separate contracts.
In such situations, evaluation of the contractor's performance of contractual
quality assurance requirements is conducted on the overall facility level
rather than on an individual contract basis. Due cognizance is given, how-










Section I, p. 1.
'
CHAPTER VII
ELEMENTS OF DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
QUALITY ASSURANCE
In the past fifteen years, industry has been endeavoring to define
those elements of quality control that can be identified with the overall cost
of a product. Although this effort was not initiated by J. M. Juran, his
pleas for systematic control of these cost elements tended to emphasize
and to popularize the need. In 1946, the General Electric Company began
to identify the elements associated with producing items for commercially
specified minimum quality levels. In 1952, the definitions that it had devel-
2
oped were applied to DOD contracts. By applying his experience with the
General Electric effort to a broad spectrum of industry, A. V. Feigenbaum
developed three categories of quality control elements: failure prevention,
3
quality appraisal, and failure correction. The next major effort to isolate
quality control elements resulted from an Air Force contract study made
by Stanford University. The final report delineated 367 elements that affect,
J. M. Juran, Quality Control Handbook (New York: McGraw-Hill,
1951).
Z
R. J. Pierce and R. E. Beames, "A Matter of Management-
Quality Cost for Missiles and Space Products, " Nineteenth Annual ASOC
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in some degree, the overall quality oi end products. These elements were
grouped into two broad classifications: deliberately undertaken functions
involving quality creation and appraisal and resultant functions generated
by the failure of products to meet specifications either before or after
delivery to the customer.
Within the DOD, there does not exist a standard definition of what
2
constitutes a procurement quality assurance element. The Air Force has
utilized a definition which relates the subparagraphs of MIL-Q-9858 to
certain quality control functions of the contractor. These are specified as
the procedures, techniques and processes which are part of the manufac-
3
turer's product quality system. The DSA uses this definition also, but
4
relates all contractor operations to their influence on product quality.
From this evidence in the literature, it is determined that existing quality
elements pertain to an industrial quality control system and have only cur-
sory, if any, relation to the DOD procurement quality assurance function.
The historical foundations for military procurement quality assur-
ance policies and procedures and their treatment in the several manuals
R. A. Hemmes, W. G. Ireson, and D. E. Morgan, Quality Cost
Analysis Implementation Handbook (Stanford: Department of Industrial
Engineering, Stanford University, December, 1964).
2
Not contained in any DOD directive nor in MIL.-STD- 109A, Military
Standard Quality Assurance Terms and Definitions (October, 1961).
3
Air Force Systems Command Manual 74-1, op. cit. , Chapter III.
4




shall be examined in the following discussion to determine what factors are
considered important to all the service philosophies. These factors are
defined as the DOD quality elements which, for purposes of this study,
shall form the basis for further comparison. Each element so identified
is discussed in each of the quality program documents considered.
All services recognize that the desired result of quality assurance
programs is acceptance of material which conforms to the requirements of
the contract. Thus, the first common element discernible is the examina-
tion of these requirements. When these are known, the field agent selects,
plans, and implements the procedures that will ensure that these require-
ments are satisfactorily achieved. He establishes the second element, a
quality assurance plan.
Within the plan, service representatives are guided by their
respective manuals in the employment of a series of major functional
activities. First among these is the discussion of methods for evaluating
the initial adequacy of a contractor's quality control and inspection system.
Maintenance of the desired quality level is described under various titles
having the general purpose of building confidence in the contractor's
procedures.
To aid the field representative in establishing the confidence level
necessary to accept a product without examining every unit characteristic,
the services endorse the use of statistical sampling techniques. Another
aid is the selective employment of product inspection operations within the
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manufacturing process. Also available are certain special tests and inspec-
tions devised on a commodity -oriented basis and special techniques for veri-
fying product testing equipment. Additionally, when the confidence level of
a contractor becomes questionable, an important factor in reestablishing
that confidence is the widely recognized element of corrective action.
The services support some type of physical product verification,
establish policies for the control of subcontracted supplies and specify
details for handling nonconforming materials including the ensuing action
to prevent recurrences. The field representative is required to maintain
records suitable for reevaluation--the quality history.
The authority to reject material presented for acceptance by the
manufacturers is granted to all field quality assurance representatives by
their respective regulations. This is a powerful tool in the hands of a
widely dispersed organization and, as such, is closely controlled by detailed
procedures.
Two other quality elements may be identified and dispatched at
this point. They have not been previously identified and, since the mutual
acceptance of procedures for their conduct has been so complete, they have
nothing to contribute to this study. These factors are (1) the preservation,
packaging, and shipping of material, and (2) the approval procedures
governing the use of POD acceptance staro ps. 2 Formal instructions
"Secretary of Defense Project 60, op. cit .
2
Department of Defense Instruction 4155. 1, Uniform Inspection and
Acceptance Stamps, JUse by the Military Departments (January 25, 1956).
•,
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contained in the manuals merely repromuigate the determinations of the
Joint Military Packaging Training Center for the former and the DOD
directives for the latter.
To recapitulate, the DOD quality elements which shall be compared
in the next chapter are listed below for convenient reference:
1. Examine contract requirements.
2. Establish a procurement quality assurance plan.
3. Evaluate the contractor's quality control system.
4. Monitor the contractor's quality control system.
5. Statistical sampling methods.
6. Inspection during production process.
7. Special tests and inspections.
8. Verification of testing equipment.
9. Corrective action requirements.
10. Product verification.
11. Control of subcontracted supplies.
12. Treatment of nonconforming material.




SIGNIFICANT SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES IN
MILITARY DEPARTMENT QUALITY ASSURANCE
Quality Element No. 1 -
Examine Contract Requirements
The Army does not specify a formal review of its contracts by the
field procurement quality assurance representative. Rather, the guidance
document informs him of what types of requirements will exist in the con-
tract. In carrying out his responsibilities, therefore, the implication exists
that the contract must be examined for these requirements before an inspec-
tion plan may be selected and developed. He is required to ascertain that
an engineering review of procurement documentation has been performed
for adequacy of technical and quality requirements.
The Navy's field representative is required to review the technical
requirements contained in the engineering data package for adequacy. In
addition, he is required to conduct a qualitative and critical examination of
contractual terms and specifications to ensure their competence, his
2
familiarity with the details, and his understanding of the requirements.




Office of Naval Material Instruction 5000. 3, op. cit . , Vol. II,






The requirement for formal contract review in the Air Force exists
for information purposes. Procurement quality assurance personnel are
expected to be familiar with the contractual provisions relative to their
function. In order to acquaint them with the general provisions which
typify contracts, a reference section is provided.
Contracts are reviewed by DSA field organizations to determine
resource requirements and special quality provisions which must be
accounted for in its procurement quality assurance program. It is expected
that inspection, acceptance, and shipping procedures will not differ sub-
stantially from standard contractual requirements. Technical and quality
3
reviews of engineering documentation are not specified.
Significant in this element is the amount of support provided the
contracting agency by the on-site field organization. The Navy policy per-
mits a great amount of interchange in order to achieve the most advantageous
contract arrangement possible. Army policy ensures that some echelon has
paid attention to the detail of the procurement. The Air Force and DSA
approach to contract review is for information and presumes that the con-
tracting agent has performed adequately in the area of quality assurance
requirements. In case of conflict or confusion, all services leave the
Air Force Contract Management Division Manual 74-1, Procure-
ment Quality Assurance Program
,
Chapter II, p. 3 (May, 1965).
2
Ibid
. , Chapter HI.
3
Defense Supply Agency Manual 8200. 1, op. cit. , para. 1-103.
'.
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avenue of clarification open between field activity and the contracting
officer.
Quality Element No. 2 -
Establish a Procurement Quality Assurance Plan
Army representatives are provided with six types of procurement
quality assurance plans for guidance. Each type addresses a different
level of contractor quality system responsibility. Instructions are detailed
in each plan for contractor system evaluation, product verification, cus-
tomer planning and operations, and interpretations of contractual supplier
obligations. The field agent' 9 task becomes one of selecting the proper
plan, integrating the production situation with the plan, and making modifi-
cations to the plan which will account for any special technical agency
directives.
Unless otherwise specifically directed, the Navy inspector has
total responsibility for determining the type, degree, and scope of pro-
curement quality assurance actions necessary to ensure that product quality
conforms to contract requirements. Systems evaluation may be performed
in accordance with either the DOD interpretive document, Handbook H50,
or the Navy check list modification thereto, Form NAVEXOs 4355/7.
Broad guidelines are established for use of the various types of product
2inspection procedures which may be modified by the procuring agency.
AMCR 715-509, op. cit. , Parts I and II.
2






Air Force planning is accomplished in accordance with specific
policies regarding contractor system evaluation and decision verification.
The former makes use of Handbook H50 as an aid in developing quality ele-
ment check lists which are used to determine the degree of conformance
with which the contractor adheres to his own instructions. This evaluation
is conducted using the fifty observation technique. Permissive instruc-
tions are provided to the representative for use in determining when to
employ mandatory physical inspection of end products.
Broad policies are implemented in the planning phase of DSA pro-
curement quality assurance operations. Contractor system evaluation is
planned in accordance with DOD Handbook H50. Verification of contractor
quality decisions is accomplished by the fifty observation technique. Con-
formance by the supplier to his own system is evaluated by establishing
quality and inspection elements for the manufacturing operation. Provision
is made for performing the mandatory product inspection directed by pro-
curement activities and for determining the necessity for similar, but
2
self-imposed, requirements.
Significant in this comparison is the amount of reliance placed on
the field quality assurance representative. In certain cases a Navy procuring
activity directs the entire procurement quality assurance effort as may be




Defense Supply Agency Manual 8200. 1, op. cit . , Sec. II.
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illustrated by the purchase characteristics of fleet ballistic missiles and
nuclear propulsion engines. In the main, however, the Navy is almost
wholly dependent upon its inspection organization to plan the complete
quality effort and testify to its adequacy. More detailed guidance is avail-
able to Air Force and DSA personnel and much more detailed requirements
are provided to Army inspectors. In effect, the Army expects the field
installation to perform operations, the DSA and Air Force expect it to
plan as directed and perform per plan, while the Navy expects it to con-
ceive the plan and perform the planned operation.
Quality Element No. 3 -
Evaluate the Contractor's Quality Control System
Initial evaluation of a contractor's quality control system is
required by all types of procurement quality assurance plans provided by
the Army for field use. The procedures used in this evaluation are depen-
dent on the type of plan specified. If the contractor is required to have a
quality control system, it may be judged using the DOD Handbook H50. All
other plans contain specific criteria which provide the standards for evalua-
tion. Technical agency participation in the examination and modification of
these criteria are permitted.
Formal evaluation by the Navy field organization is required by
some technical bureaus when major, new contracts are placed with a






manufacturer. This supports the otherwise very general requirements
that the contractor's system should be evaluated. Examinations are con-
ducted using the applicable portions of the Navy guidelines for review,
Form NAVEXOs 4355/7. Which portions are appropriate is deduced from
the contract requirements for the supplier quality systems and from the
evaluation factors provided by the procurement offices and other partici-
2
pating agencies.
Prior to the development of an Air Force quality assurance plan,
the field representative is required to conduct a system elements evaluation
of the contractor's procedures. The bases for such evaluation are the
contractual specifications as interpreted by DOD Handbook H50 and the
degree of compliance exhibited by the contractor to his own established
procedures.
Prior to or at the start of production, DSA activities perform the
initial evaluations on the basis of the manufacturer's conformance to his
written quality program. Technical assistance may be requested or
directed and purchasing agents may participate in such reviews as deemed
4
necessary.





Office of Naval Material Instruction 5000. 3, op. cit. , par. 207261,
3
Air Force Contract Management Division Manual 74-1, op. cit . ,
Chapter IV.
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Significant in this evaluation element is the dependence of DSA on
the producer's quality systems which exist at the time a contract is
awarded, regardless of the type of material purchased. This approach is
a large portion of the Air Force evaluation criteria but appears to be inci-
dental to the Army and Navy reviews. The latter two departments employ
a product -oriented evaluation with the Army being more precise in its
criteria for the determination of adequacy than the Navy.
Quality Element No. 4 -
Monitoring the Contractor's Quality Control System
Army field organizations are enjoined to perform systems evalua-
tion continually and concurrently with product verification inspection, using
the same criteria specified for initial review efforts.
Similar criteria are used for Navy activities except that certain
technical bureaus require the entire review to be conducted whenever
major changes in the contractor's quality system occur and at such other
times as the field representative detects cause for reappraisal. The term
"such other times" refers to increasing internal or external detection of
product deficiencies.
After the initial evaluation, Air Force policy introduces the meth-
ods of continuous audit to provide surveillance of the contractor's quality
control system. These methods include establishing criteria for determining
!AMCR 715-509, loc. cit.
2
Bureau of Naval Weapons Instruction 4330. 12, loc. cit.
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mandatory product control, continuing original system element evaluation
as refined by quality history, and implementing contractor quality decision
verification techniques.
A similar situation to the Air Force exists for installations of the
DSA except that the establishment of mandatory inspection criteria is not
wholly determined by the cognizant representative. Purchasing offices may
specify mandatory product verification and must be apprised of monitoring
2
results before changes can be effected.
Significant in the systems monitoring efforts of the several depart-
ments is the subordination of such reviews to product verification by the
Navy. A similar emphasis is implied in Army documentation because of
the relative amount of detail that governs product verification as compared
to system evaluation. The approach of the Air Force and the DSA reflects
a strengthening of system evaluation and analysis and a dependence on the
results thereof to indicate the necessity for increasing the level of product
verification.
Quality Element No. 5
Statistical Sampling Methods
Statistical sampling techniques are provided to Army field installa-
tions for use with the product verification function of all inspection plans.
Air Force Contract Management Division Manual 74-1, op. cit. ,
Section B.
2





Current methods reflect DOD approved sampling plans for customer use
and military specification plans appropriate to both supplier and customer.
Selection of the proper statistical method is the responsibility of the quality
assurance representative. Its selection should provide for maintaining
confidence in the quality of the end product commensurate with the objective
quality level demonstrated by the contractor. Minimum amounts of product
verification are specified regardless of observable supplier competence.
This minimum is defined as the statistical sample of every tenth lot of
material produced.
Navy inspectors select statistical methods from the same set of
DOD and military specification plans. The application of these techniques
to production items is entirely within the purview of the field agency as
guided by very general policy. Minimum product verification effort is not
modified from that contained in the statistical plans used. However, the
practicality of further reductions in required effort is recognized and is
2
subject to authorization by the technical bureaus.
Very broad guidelines are provided to Air Force representatives
for the selection and application of statistical sampling techniques. The
practical utilization of these plans is discussed to differentiate valid from
acceptable methods. Departures from the existing plans are recognized as
AMCR 715-509, op. cit. , Part 3, Chapters 3-11.
2




statistically invalid but may be employed provided that such deviations are
not rejected by the procuring agency. Skip-lot sampling techniques have
resulted.
DSA recognizes all available statistical plans and provides definite
criteria to aid in selecting the appropriate methods. In addition, the ESA
has approved certain skip-lot sampling plans tor successively reducing the
amount of product verification required. Further reduction is not authorized
when inspection has been reduced to the statistical sampling of every eighth
3
lot of material produced.
Significant in this quality element is the unanimity of recognition
that practical application of statistical sampling techniques is difficult
under conditions of limited manpower, large production volume, and con-
current systems evaluations. Army and DSA procedures limit the amount
of reduction in product verification whereas Air Force and Navy procedures
could result in practically no physical inspection.
Quality Element No. 6 -
Inspection During Production Process
Army directives for the conduct of in-process inspection are based
on the philosophy that product verification should be performed at the highest
level of assembly consistent with the adequate assurance of quality in the
Air Force Contract Management Division Manual 74-1, op. cit. ,
Chapter 17.
Z
Air Force Bulletin 520, Statistical Sampling Using Skip-Lot
Methods, May 17, I960.
3




item. If the quality of the end product can be validated during a final inspec-
tion, there will be no in-process effort. However, provisions exist for
field representatives to ensure inspection of important characteristics at
process points whenever it is impractical to verify these characteristics at
end-product levels.
The Navy subscribes to an identical philosophy. It prescribes,
however, that the impracticability criteria be applied only to those char-
acteristics whose validation reflects upon end-product acceptability and
2
which become hidden or inaccessible in the completed article.
Performance of in-process inspection by Air Force representatives
is limited to two types of activity. One type is applied on selected charac-
teristics or processes for determining the adequacy of contractor controls.
Once this adequacy has been established, the decision verification technique
replaces that effort. The other type is the performance of temporary
inspection at points in production where causes of observed or potential
defects are detectable. This type is also replaced by decision verification
3
when the condition has been corrected by the contractor.
The DSA recognizes the use of in-process inspection in a manner
similar to the Air Force concept. However, a class of mandatory inspec-
tion activity exists which allows a procurement agency to direct inspection
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effort within a production process. In this event, a quality history is gen-
erated and the purchasing office is encouraged to relax its requirements as
soon as the evidence supports such action.
Significant in this element of procurement quality assurance activity
are the dichotomous approaches among the service departments. The Army
and Navy do not allow complete withdrawal from product verification of
those characteristics initially important enough to warrant in-process
inspection. Although the decision verification techniques of the Air Force
and the DSA may include some direct inspection of the product, the impli-
cation is that it will be very widely scattered throughout the life of the pro-
duction contract.
Quality Element No. 7 -
Special Tests and Inspections
Army requirements for this quality element generally are specified
in the contracts. They will include, but will not necessarily be limited to,
preproduction tests to verify quality requirements , initial production tests
to establish probability of future conformance with quality requirements,
proof acceptance tests involving product performance requirements, and
periodic comparison testing to ensure continued compliance with procure-
ment requirements of all types. Such examinations are normally performed
2
at sites detached from the manufacturer's facility.
Defense Supply Agency Manual 8200. 1, op. cit. , p. 17.





Similar requirements in the Navy are included in the function of the
individual technical bureaus that design anci incorporate them into contracts
as engineering tests and inspections. There are no overall minimum
requirements specified with respect to quality conformance. The Navy does
require, however, that field agents coordinate special tests which establish
the properties of materials and components used in the production of its
articles. Such tests are physical, chemical, functional, and qualificational.
They are conducted by the contractor and are corroborated by periodic,
independent tests performed at government laboratories.
Minimum Air Force requirements include qualification tests,
preproduction examinations, and first article configuration inspections.
All of these are contractually specified and are normally conducted at the
contractor's facility. Field quality assurance personnel maintain cognizance
over other tests and inspections called engineering evaluation and analysis,
system tests, or operational tests in order to detect evidence of need for
quality improvements.
DSA agents are dependent on contract provisions and instructions
from purchasing offices for the determination of quality assurance test
activity required. Detailed guidance is provided for the frequently required
validation of qualification tests and performance of first production
Office of Naval Material Instruction 5000. 3, op. cit. , Part F.
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Significant in this area is the lack of minimum requirements in the
Navy and the subsequent dependence on its field activities for adequate pro-
cedures which are applicable within the contractual scope of the work. This
characteristic of Navy procurement relates to the Navy's position in Quality
Element No. 2, the planning effort. The Army and Air Force have sys-
tematized its requirements into product -oriented contract specifications.
The difference between the latter two services' approach is the degree of
involvement allowed the supplier during such tests. The DSA position is
unique in that its role is reactive rather than creative.
Quality Element No. 3 -
Verification of Testing Equipment
Army field representatives are provided detailed procedures for
use whenever a calibration system for test equipment is required by the
2
procurement documents. The verification consists of ensuring the adequacy
of procedures used by the contractor in maintaining the accuracy of the
equipment. This includes the standards used and the sources thereof,
environmental controls, calibration intervals and identification, detailed
calibration procedures, and control of sub-supplier calibration. The local
quality assurance representative is supported in this effort by the test
equipment verification laboratories and metrology specialists available
Defense Supply Agency Manual 8200. 1, op. cit. , Sec. VII.
2




within each technical command.
Instructions to Navy organizations are very general and appear as
sub-elements to those quality elements which are discussed in more detail.
The Bureau of Ships and Weapons if. credited with initiative in the area of
test equipment accuracy evaluation and calibration policies. Its directives
range from procurement to operational use of delicate electronic and
2
weapons systems. Inclusion of contract requirements for adequate cali-
bration systems and the use of the DOD interpretive handbook are current
3
techniques which aid field agencies in verifying test equipment.
Air Force instructions are very detailed. DOD Handbook H52 is
4
clarified for specific commodity application by its field agents.
Quality assurance representatives of the DSA are also instructed
to verify test equipment in accordance with the DOD Handbook H52.
Metrology specialists, approved commercial laboratories, and government
5laboratories are available to aid in the accomplishment of this function.
AMCR 715-509, op. cit. , Part II, Chapter 7.
2
Bureau of Naval vVeapons Instruction 4355. 5A, BuWeps Calibration
Program, E tablishment of (September 22, 1961); and Bureau of Naval Ships
Instruction 4355. 17, Quality Control System for Complex Supplies and
Equipment (May 22, 1961); and BuWeps Standards Laboratory Information
Manual (prepared by U.S. Navy Metrology Engineering Center, Pomona,
California).
3
Department of Defense Handbook H-52, Evaluation of a Contrac-
tor's Calibration System (July 7, 1964).
4




Defense Supply Agency Manual 8200. 1, op. cit. , Sec. X, part 1.
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Significant to this element is the uniformity of approach to an
extremely complex and highly specialized endeavor wherein the ability to
measure is frequently overtaken by the performance of military material.
Quality Element No. 9 -
Corrective Action Requirements
Corrective action requirements at the Army field level are based
on the expectation that contractors will take prompt action to correct the
cause of manufactured products failing to meet contract specifications.
This policy extends to supplier action designed to prevent such occurrences.
vVhen prompt action is not taken, field personnel are responsible for notify-
ing the procuring activity that will determine the appropriate contractual
sanction.
The Navy does not separate corrective action from the normal
functions of procurement quality assurance. The requirement to effect
corrective action is directed to the contractor on each observation of system
deficiency or product defectiveness. Such notification may be oral or writ-
ten, depending on the criticality and frequency of the deficiency. Determina-
tion of the adequacy of such corrective action is the responsibility of the
representative. No specific guidance is provided since the contractor is
2
expected to react favorably to knowledge of defects.
^MCR 715-509, op. cit.
, pp. 2-1-202, 2-2-202, and 2-4-202.
2
Office of Naval Material Instruction 5000. 2, op. cit.
,
pars.




Air Force corrective action procedures are described in four
levels of severity. The requirement for corrective action may be satisfied
on the spot. In more complex situations, a written deficiency report may
be required. Should the contractor fail to take adequate corrective action,
a formal letter may be used and, if this is not effective, recommendations
to the procuring agency are made for appropriate contractual sanctions
including notification oi the cessation of product acceptance. Adequacy of
corrective action is determined by temporary product verification at the
production point affected or by the progress of corrective action projects
in the case of complex conditions.
The DSA policy for corrective action is an exact duplicate of the
2
Air Force concept.
Significant in this element is the delegation of contracting officer
authority and responsibility to the field level of the Navy. Timeliness is
the key factor in the Navy's determination of adequate corrective action and
differentiates its policy from the other military agencies.
Quality Element No. 10 -
Product Verification
The product verification policy for Army field representatives is
highly detailed. Its performance introduces the necessity for classifying
Air Force Contract Management Division Manual 74-1, op. cit. ,
pp. 4-16 to 4-18.
2
Defense Supply Agency Manual 8200. 1, op. cit. , Sec. II, part 5.
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the characteristics inspected according to their ultimate effect on the prod-
uct. Characteristics classified as critical are inspected by means of a rigid
sampling technique which prohibits sampling until 920 consecutive units have
been successfully produced. The policy reinstates 100 per cent screening
upon detection of a single defective item. Other attributes are acceptable
upon validation by statistical methods. Product verification is expected to
be performed independently of the supplier but allowance is made for wit-
nessing tests provided that the inspector is personally capable of perform-
ing the test and an independent examination is not feasible.
Navy performance of product verification utilizes the classification
of defects concept. Critical potential defects are inspected by a sampling
plan which does not allow reduction of inspection below the statistical confi-
dence limit that 99. 7 per cent of the attributes were acceptable. Other
2
attributes are sampled in accordance with standard plans and modified
3
techniques which have not been rejected by the technical bureaus.
Continuous product verification not subject to replacement by deci-
sion verification is discussed in Air Force instructions. Generally, this
type of mandatory product control is confined to confirming end product
4
functions. The characteristics subject to such inspection are treated by
!AMCR 715-509, op. cit . , Part 2.
2
Specification MIL -STD-105D, op. cit ., revised August, 1962.
3
Office of Naval Material Instruction 5000. 3, op. cit. , p. 78i.
4
Air Force Contract Management Division Manual, op. cit . , App. D.
»rfj V
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sampling methods except that critical classifications of characteristics are
screened 100 per cent. The classification of characteristic approach,
although designed for engineering use, is endorsed for guidance of the qual-
ity assurance representative in determining his initial efforts prior to
2
acquiring a quality history. In addition, the policy formalizes a manda-
tory visual, safety -type final product inspection.
The DSA recognizes the characteristic classification technique
but does not segregate the product verification sampling plans to be used
for specific classifications. The standard statistical plans are applied to
all mandatory inspections required by purchasing offices unless otherwise
specified.
Significant in the comparison of this element is the extent of prod-
uct verification directed by policy making offices within each department.
With the exception of DSA, all departments specify severe requirements
for the verification of characteristics critical to the function of their prod-
uct. In other situations, the Army specifies how much shall be done and
when, the Navy reserves the right to perform any amount of product veri-
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Quality Element No. 1
1
Control of Subcontracted Supplies
Uppermost in the Army consideration of this element is the con-
tractual requirement that the prime supplier is responsible for controlling
the quality of material purchased from a subcontractor. A separate and
detailed inspection plan is provided to field representatives for determining
the adequacy of a contractor's performance in this area. The major require
ment in determining when to evaluate performance at a subcontractor's
facility is whether such action is essential in adjudging end product
acceptability. The choice of product verification or sub-supplier system
evaluation is determined by a secondary set of factors which include: the
economics of material and labor; subcontractor special or proprietary
processes; availability of special tools and instruments; and the adequacy
of test and inspection reports which purport to represent the article. The
inspection plan anticipates that another Army field agency is cognizant of
the sub -supplier. In addition, the field agency reviews subcontracts issued
by the prime contractor to ensure that necessary quality requirements are
included.
The Navy recognizes prime contractor responsibility to control his
suppliers. Evaluation of the need for source inspection is based on the
functional criticality of the article supplied, prime contractor requirements
for ensuring the quality of these functions, and the best interest of the
AMCR 715-509. op. cit. , Part II, Chapter 6.
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government. Interest of the government is determined by considering the
availability and adequacy of test and inspection reports concerning the func-
tions, the necessity for verifying those reports, the availability of special
tools and test equipment, and whether the article is shipped direct to a DOD
using activity. Subcontract review is used by Navy field activities in a
manner similar to the Army. The Navy approach to sub -supplier product
verification or system evaluation does not anticipate Navy personnel at the
subcontractor level.
Contractor responsibility for this element is endorsed by the Air
Force. The basic criteria for inspection at a subcontractor's plant are the
complexity of the article and the criticality of application, together with the
inability of the prime contractor to ascertain the quality characteristics at
his own facility. Such characteristics are verified by 100 per cent screen-
ing. The criteria of direct shipment to DOD using activities are recognized
also. System element evaluation techniques are used on other subcontracts
in accordance with a detailed list of prime contractor practices which dem-
onstrate a sound approach to control of these purchases. Periodic and
unscheduled sub-supplier inspections may be combined with system evalua-
tion to determine subcontractor capability and prime contractor effective-
ness. Temporary source inspection may be undertaken in the case of failure
2
to correct deficiencies.
Office of Naval Material Instruction 5000. 3, op. cit .
, pp. 7-6, 7-7.
2





DSA policies are reflections of the provisions of ASPR, Section XIV.
Procurement quality assurance action at the subcontractor level is performed
when shipments are made direct to DOD using activities or when the purchas-
ing office specifies government inspections which cannot be accomplished by
prime contractors. DSA field offices having cognizance of prime contracts
may utilize selected evaluations at sub-supplier levels to verify the main-
tenance of contractor control over these supplies. Additionally, the factors
which demonstrate a sound approach to such controls are included in the
quality element evaluations.
Significant in the comparison of this element is the broad, inter-
pretive judgment required of Navy field activities in determining what is in
the best interest of the government. Army judgments are based on more
detailed criteria. Operations are strictly defined and controlled. Air Force
and DSA philosophy is restrictive and designed to minimize direct sub-
supplier actions.
Quality Element No. 12 -
Treatment of Nonconforming Material
The Army procurement quality assurance program does not discuss
this element. The authority to disposition nonconforming material is vested
in the technical commands. As indicated in Chapter III, this responsibility
is often delegated to an on-site representative, but the exercise of the
Defense Supply Agency Manual 8200. 1, op. cit. , Section IV.
.-
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authority is limited to judgments of defective characteristics which have
minor effect on the product. The existence of pre-established defect classi-
fications is important to thi6 delegation since the field agency is not granted
the authority to classify. The establishment of nonconforming material
review boards at contractor plants depends on the availability of on-site
technical command representation. When established, however, these
boards have authority to disposition nonconforming supplies having major
or critical effects on the article.
Navy policy allows the disposition of minor discrepancies to be
performed at the inspector level. This authority may be withdrawn, how-
ever, by the cognizant technical bureau by virtue of its authority to control
2
material review board operations. Boards may be established by technical
bureaus with local quality assurance representation but their authority
remains restricted to minor deviations. Technical bureaus also determine
the amount of classification authority which may be delegated to the field
3
representative when formal classification of defects is absent.
Broad authority is granted to the Air Force inspector for disposi-
4
tion of material containing variances. Variances are defined in a manner
'aMCR 715-509. op. cit.
<
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Bureau of Naval Weapons Instruction 4355. 12, Air Force and
BqAer, Navy Department Policy for Material Review (February, I960).
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similar to the minor classification of the Army and Navy. Most variance
disposition decisions are made by the contractor subject to audit by field
personnel. Material review board action demanding customer concurrence
is reserved for those cases wherein a precedent does not exist. The Air
Force philosophy is that the most important ection to be taken by the board
is prompt and effective corrective measures which will prevent recurrence
of the variance. Other types of discrepancies are referred to the procuring
1
agency.
Authority to disposition nonconforming material is not granted by
DSA. It may be granted by the purchasing office to a Contract Administra-
tion Office for exercise in accordance with DSA material classes I and II.
Class I corresponds to major and critical characteristics and is normally
retained by the purchasing offices. Class II applies to all other material
and functional defects. When the authority is granted, the role of the field
representative is advisory to the CAS office. Material review boards may
be established by this office whereupon the local inspector is delegated the
2
disposition authority.
Significant to this element is the recognition by ail services of the
need to classify the effects of nonconforming characteristics. The names
of these classifications differ but the controls placed upon acceptance of the
Air Force Specification Bulletin No. 515, Control of Nonconform-
ing Supplies (November 3, 1959).
2
Defense Supply Agency Manual 8200. 1, op. cit. , Sec. V, Part I.
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discrepancies which affect performance, durability, reliability, and inter-
changeability are substantially the same. Air Force policy reflects a higher
degree of reliance upon its suppliers.
Quality Element No. 13 -
Maintenance of Quality History Records
Quality history records exist for two purposes: as an aid to the
field agencies in detecting trends in their own and the contractor's quality
effort and as a means of communicating procurement quality assurance
results to external organizations. This quality element is of sufficient mag-
nitude to include in this study. The last major tabulation of quality history
records produced for external distribution is contained in the Secretary of
Defense Project 60, Sub-Task Force I, report dated March, 1963. No effort
has been made to corroborate the results.
Significant in that report was the existence of 145 such records and
forms. Only two were used by all four service organizations and nine were
used by more than one organization. The remaining 134 records were
unique to individual services.
Quality Element No. 14 -
Rejection Authority and Discontinuance of Inspection
Army rejection authority is vested in the use of mathematically
sound statistical sampling plans. The exercise of the authority depends on
product verification results. Upper limits for such inspection activity are
not specified except in the case of critical characteristics where 100 per cent
I 9UoitW
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screening is directed. Contracting officers may authorize discontinuance of
inspection of critical characteristics. This action must be recommended by
the field quality assurance representative, supported by excessive defects
and a failure by the supplier to take action to correct the conditions that
allowed the defect to occur. There is no rejection authority associated with
contractor quality systems evaluation. Requests for corrective action is the
method specified for improving discrepant systems and preventing the recur-
rence of defective products. Corrective action is not rejectabie but can be
judged ineffective by the results of continuing high levels of product verifi-
cation. When contractor quality control system requirements are included
in the contract, a procedure exists for discontinuing product inspection for
serious system deficiencies without prior approval by the contracting officer.
Seriousness is described as that which is likely to result in the supplier,
directly or indirectly, concluding that nonconforming material is conforming.
The authority to reject material in the Navy procurement quality
assurance organization is based on department and DOD approved sampling
plans and the objective evidence of defective articles detected by product
verification procedures. Field activities are not guided as to the maximum
inspection expected nor are there instructions for the employment of inspec-
tion discontinuance as an element of this authority. This condition is modi-
fied if the statistical procedures of DOD Handbook H109 are selected for use.






This procedure provides for the routine discontinuance of inspection after a
specified maximum product verification effort has determined the supplier's
inspection system to be defective. Contractor quality control system defi-
ciencies are not subject to rejection. However, an identical system of cor-
rective action procedures exists for material and system defects. The
degree to which this system is appropriate is broadly defined and, there-
fore, leaves the extent of application to the judgment of the field representa-
tive. Recourse to the procuring agency is restricted to the provisions of
the ASPR wherein the procurement quality assurance segment can recom-
mend that the contractor show cause for not terminating the contract for
default.
Rejection authority relates to the amount and type of product
verification employed by Air Force on-site representatives. In addition
to material defects observed, deficiencies resulting from contractor deci-
sion verification and system element evaluation may be subjected to a
specific sequence of corrective action steps. The first of these is oral,
on-the-spot corrective action. This may be followed by written notification
to the contractor, initially by discrepancy report format, then by formal
letter, if warranted. Should these measures be ineffective, the Air Force
Department of Defense Handbook H109, op. cit .
2






agent may request the contracting officer to authorize discontinuance of
product acceptance.
An exactly identical procedure to that of the Air Force is employed
by DSA field agents. Different nomenclature is used for the levels of cor-
2
rective action requested of contractors.
Significant in the comparison of this element is the degree of
responsibility placed upon Navy procurement quality assurance activities.
Rejection authority in all services must be substantiated by product verifi-
cation results. No articles can be rejected on the basis of system evalua-
tion even though all agencies, except the Navy, recognize inspection dis-
continuance as a method of obtaining quality system improvements.
Air Force Contract Management Division Manual 74-1, op. cit.
,
Chapter 4, Sec. B.
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CHAPTER IX
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE PROJECT 60
QUALITY ASSURANCE RESULTS
The sub -task group of Project 60 which studied the procurement




indicates that the over -all quality assurance con-
tract management mission is essentially the same. The chief differ-
ences are the manner of implementation, terminology, geographical
boundaries
. . .
and metrology program. *
Accordingly, most of the conclusions anc recommendations offered
were oriented toward improving organization, coordination, education, and
personnel administration. Technical recommendations for inclusion in a
unified Quality Assurance Manual were not as extensive as anticipated.
Difficulties with terminology and wide variations in the treatment of quality
elements by existing instructions prevented more detailed analysis. The
2
need for further intensive study was recognized and recommended.
Some technical evaluations and recommendations of the sub-group
are pertinent to this paper. Metrology implications of complex, high dollar














value, low-volume procurements led to the conclusion that individual
service activity should be continued and consolidated DOD effort acceler-
ated. Simultaneously, more reliance on contractor metrology programs
was recommended after providing for appropriate contractual responsi-
bility. The improvements which have resulted from this conclusion are
reflected in Chapter VIII under Quality Element No. 8.
The study also concluded that source inspection on low dollar value,
non-critical or commercially available components was unjustifiable. This
use oi procurement quality assurance resources was not considered com-
mensurate with existing instructions and diluted the effort which should be
2
expended on contracts critical to major programs.
The detailed examination of contract requirements was evaluated
most effective when conducted at the lowest possible level of operations.
This lowest level was described, however, as a function of the complexity,
uniqueness, and frequency of the procurements.
Specific recommendations were made which affect the evaluation
of a contractor's quality control system. Development of detailed DOD
evaluation documents for all levels of effort required of contractors was
strongly advised. Mandatory evaluations were recommended prior to any
material acceptances when a contractor was performing his first govern-














major production after a 120-day interruption. The feasibility of establish-
ing monitoring criteria and systematic reevaluations was deferred to future
interservice coordination.
The sub-group concluded that initiation of on-site procurement
quality assurance plans should be undertaken by the procuring activity.
Such planning instructions were envisioned as containing all necessary
descriptions of what shall be inspected and when, where, and how it shall
be inspected. The local representative would remain responsible for the
detailed planning which would be subject to disapproval by the procuring
activity. General quality assurance plans, similar to the Army quality




Product verification was viewed by the sub-group as tending toward
deemphasis. The reversal of this trend was considered necessary although
its accomplishment was not viewed optimistically without a centralized pro-
3
curement quality assurance organization.
Minimization of quality history records externally distributed was
recommended for early consideration. In this case, also, it was advised













The sub-group recommended that nonconforming material review
board authority to accept minor discrepancies be delegated to field repre-
sentatives without reservation. Procuring activities should retain the
right to disposition other nonconformances and the prerogative of delegating
its authority to specific individuals of requisite qualifications. Standards
for material review board operations were deferred to interservice
coordination.
The major recommendation to prepare a standard Procurement
Quality Assurance Manual contained the caution that this document would
be subject to two serious limitations. The manual should be compatible
with existing service instructions and would require sufficient flexibility











TOWARD UNIFIED PROCUREMENT QUALITY ASSURANCE
On April 14, 1954, the DOD promulgated the following basic quality
assurance policy statements:
1. Responsibility rests upon the contractors and producing
activities for controlling product quality and for offering to the
Military Departments for acceptance only those items or lots of
items considered by them to conform to contractual requirements;
and
2. Responsibility rests upon the Military Departments for
determining that contractual requirements have been complied with
prior to the acceptance of the product. *
Underlying the development of this concept of contractor responsi-
bility was the realization that, however intensive, customer inspection
cannot provide adequate protection against receipt of inferior material.
This is particularly true in the case of highly complex articles whose
acceptability can be evaluated conclusively only by performing tests to
destruction. The amount of customer inspection, therefore, becomes a
function of the ability of the supplier to prevent production of defective
2
material and of the evidence with which he supports that ability.
Department of Defense Instruction 4355. 6, Department of Defense
Quality Assurance Concept and Policy (April 14, 1954); since cancelled and
reissued on June 15, 1964, to include DSA.
2








All military departments have published endorsements of the first
policy statement. The organizations which were charged with achieving the
second policy statement approached their common responsibility in a man-
ner sufficiently different to be burdensome to both industry and each other.
The committee on Appendix Q, therefore, was chartered to formulate a
widely applicable procedure for use by all field levels of procurement qual-
ity assurance. This charter was supported by the philosophy then develop-
ing in the offices of the Director for Quality and Reliability Assurance,
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Installations and Logistics
(OASD, I & D). This philosophy sought to serve the best interests of DOD
and industry by performing the procurement quality assurance function with
a minimum of different organizations. The viability of such an organization
was believed dependent on strong centralized management direction and
clear organizational identity. The concept also considered the effectiveness
of the procurement quality assurance program to be contingent on the
2
authority to render objective, independent judgments of product integrity.
Each military department and the ESA brought to the coordinating
committee meetings their peculiar set of policies and procedures. These,
together with the techniques and methods which emerged in each agency to
Interview with George Brown, U.S. Navy Alternate Representa-
tive to the ASPR XIV Review and Coordinating Committee, February 9, 1967.
2
John J. Riordan, MDOD Quality and Reliability Assurance Admin-
istration and Organization, " POD Cost Reduction Journal , Winter 1966-67,





support the DOD concept represented years of internal coordination and
development. This was true of the recently established DSA, also, inasmuch
as its quality management team was selected from the personnel who had
participated in the departmental evolution of quality assurance programs.
Each approach had served adequately to perform the responsibility of
accepting material in conformance with contractual requirements. Each
service approached the coordinating task confident that the others would
recognize the value of its procedures for performing the unified procurement
quality assurance function.
The initial consolidation efforts were directed toward the amounts
of product verification performed by each agency. The Army inspected
more of the product than the Navy, which in turn inspected more than the
Air Force or DSA. The Army specified in its contracts what procurement
quality assurance would be performed; the Navy reserved the right to per-
form any type and quantity; while the Air Force documented its intention to
perform as little as the contractor's results would allow. DSA tended to
perform as directed by procurement agencies and to emphasize supplier
quality results in order to proportionately minimize that direction. As
committee action progressed, the Army and Navy agreed on the degree of
assurance atainable from direct inspection effort and the Air Force and
Interview with S. G. Hamner, U.S. Navy Representative to
ASPR XIV Review and Coordinating Committee, January 26, 1967. Cor-
roborated by R. C. Tyner, U.S. Army Representative and initial Chairman
of the Committee, on January 27, 1967.
J
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DSA agreed on the degree attainable from indirect inspection and system
evaluation.
In December, 1965, the first preliminary draft of Appendix Q was
published. It was a detailed procedural manual which discussed, in depth,
ail the quality elements identified in Chapter VII. These procedures
reflected the adaptation of methods previously employed by one or more of
the agencies on an element -by-element basis. This composite differed
from the initial expectation of the members to modify an existing service
program.
The composition of the manual showed that the Navy viewpoint pre-
vailed in establishing the organization level at which the procurement data
package requirements were reviewed for contractual and technical adequacy.
Navy techniques for verifying special processes and its definition of when
to employ inspection during a production process were included. The Army
system of providing detailed quality assurance plans for each level of con-
tractor quality responsibility was adapted. The manual also supported the
Army's preproduction and proof testing techniques. Traditional Army and
Navy product verification policies and statistical sampling methods were
incorporated. Absolute minimum product verification levels were adopted
from Army procedures. Step techniques in achieving corrective action
reflected the prevalance of the Air Force concept of this quality element.




This method was modified, however, to include the Army's policy of dis-
continuing inspection and acceptance concurrent with referral to the pro-
curing agency rather than awaiting authorization. Air Force techniques in
verifying contractor control of purchased supplies and its procedures for
monitoring a contractor's quality control system using element checklists
appeared in the manual. The basic policy for treatment of nonconforming
material by the Air Force was modified to restrict the reliance placed on
suppliers and to incorporate Army documentary practices for referring
significant deficiencies to procuring agencies. Other quality elements
were used as existent when significant agreement was evident, as in test
equipment calibration and verification, or were separately negotiated when
the diversity was extreme, as in quality history records.
Significant by their absence in the preliminary draft were the fol-
lowing concepts:
1. Contractor decision verification
2. Fifty observation methods.
3. Mandatory product control classifications.
4. Mandatory inspection classifications.
Significant because of its presence is the following quotation from
the proposed Appendix Q:
Purpose. The purpose of this Supplement is to provide operating
procedures for Government representatives assigned to plants of
Department of Tefense (DOD) suppliers. Where necessary, operating
procedures pertaining to procurement quality assurance efforts above
the supplier's plant level are also included.
'-
83
Application. The Military Departments or the Defense Contract
Administration Services (DCAS) shall not issue alternative procedures
to this Supplement. DOD handbooks and manuals which concern mat-
ters related to quality assurance (e. g. , DOD handbooks H-50, H-51,
H-52) shall be used as appropriate to complement and supplement the
procedures specified herein. Departmental publications covering the
same subject matter as this Supplement shall not be used. The forms
and instructions to be used for the actions and procedures herein
shall be those provided in this Supplement. Other forms and instruc-
tions serving the identical intent and purpose are not authorized.
The preliminary draft of Appendix Q was reviewed by industry and
interested DOD agencies. The comments were editorial and nonsubstantive.
Accordingly, after minor changes, a second preliminary draft was submit-
ted to OASD (I & L) on March 1, 1966. At this time, the Air Force reserved
the right to submit a minority opinion. This dissenting endorsement of the
manual affected the ensuing change in the chairmanship of the committee
from the Army to a member of the Quality and Reliability Assurance
Directorate of OASD (I &t L). The committee continued its negotiations
which, proving unprofitable, culminated in the November, 1966, request
that the Air Force submit its own draft of Appendix Q.
The third preliminary draft by the Air Force added contractor
decision verification techniques and mandatory product control procedures.
The most significant difference, however, was the proposed exception of
military resident procurement offices from mandatory use of Appendix Q.
In the Air Force, thirty of these offices verified and accepted material






representing 85 per cent of the purchasing dollar. These residencies, in
addition to fifty-eight Navy and thirteen Army offices, had been exempted
2
fromthe DCAS reorganization of contract management functions. The rea-
son given for the proposed exemption was that supplementary instructions
would still be necessary for each product verified by the resident organiza-
tions and that the March, 1966, Appendix Q did not recognize departures
necessitated by production peculiarities or uniqueness of the purchased
3
material.
In contrast to the Air Force, the Army and Navy considered the
third preliminary draft to be deficient inasmuch as minimum product veri-
fication limits were not specified. At about the same time that the Air
Force submitted its December, 1966, version of Appendix Q, the DSA
released a preliminary revision of its procurement quality assurance
manual which also did not specify a lower limit for direct inspection pro-
4
cedures. This document, not yet officially published, represents a depar
5
ture from previous DSA policy.
Interview with R. P. Hussey, Air Force Representative to the
ASPR XIV Review and Coordinating Committee, January 25, 1967.
2
Department of Defense Instruction 4105. 59H, POD Directory of
Contract Management Services Components (April, 1966).
3
Interview with Hussey, op. cit
.
4
Interview with Hamner, op. cit .
5





Also during 1966, the DSA was developing a procurement quality
assurance philosophy of X, Y, and Z segments. Segment X was being
designed as a form of contract which would commit the procuring services
to the policies DSA had established for the quality assurance of its assigned
contracts. Interservice coordination was to precede the promulgation of
this segment and would identify the DSA procurement quality assurance
program but would not contain procedural matters. Segment Y would con-
tain the procedures by which the field representative would implement the
understandings reached in the X segment. This segment would not be
coordinated. Segment Z would exist for information and would not be binding
on any procurement agency or field representative. Its purpose would be
to identify the differences in commodities, associated industrial techniques
and production state of the art. This effort was undertaken in the belief
that knowledge of uniqueness would tend to improve the procurement con-
tracts and their administration.
On January 17, 1967, the Director of Quality and Reliability Assur-
ance for OASD (I & L), Mr. John J. Riordan, notified the chairman of the
committee to commence a paragraph -by-para graph review of ASPR XIV and
Appendix Q. The object of this review was to report the necessity for addi-
tional DOD directives which would ensure implementation of the regulatory
Interview with Donald T. Vining, Head, Quality Plans and




policies to be agreed upon. It was intended that DOD policy statements
amplify Appendix Q and, if peculiarities did exist, that these not be dis
cussed in the ASPR.








There is an extraordinary degree of similarity in the departmental
approaches to most of the quality elements. The differences which do exist
are discernible in Chapter VIII. From that evidence it is concluded that
there are only two principal differences among the procurement quality
assurance philosophies. These are:
1. The amount of physical product verification considered neces-
sary in order to discharge the departmental responsibility assigned by
DOD.
2. The degree to which product peculiarities and unique production
environments necessitate the use of procedures, methods, and techniques
tailored specifically for the material whose quality is being validated.
The effect of these differences on achieving a uniform quality manual
is discussed in Chapter X. Upon the events thus described is based the con-
clusion that an unforeseeable depth of conviction existed in support of each
divergent approach to product verification and quality assurance planning for
individual procurement articles.
The foregoing analysis supports the hypothesis of this paper. In





areas for future study. The first of these is the cause for the strength of
opinions regarding how much product verification is sufficient. The author
believes that there are several causes:
1. Unrealistic, uneconomical, and inefficient specifications for
quality in production and at user levels. This situation arises from:
2. The inability to measure the value to the final user of the
quality assurance effort conducted by contractors or by government
personnel. Current value is intuitively determined and effectiveness
is expressed only in relative terms. This deficiency, in turn, affects:
3. The failure to achieve a precise mathematical or functional
relationship between the amount of DOD procurement quality assurance
effort, the reliability, integrity, and demonstrated performance of
DOD suppliers, and military effectiveness of material in operational
performance environments.
The resulting inference is that multi -agency agreement concerning
procurement quality assurance systems should not be expected below the
policy-making level. The complexity, magnitude, and multiplicity of varia-
bles which affect each defense procurement are not conducive to centralized
management of procedures and methodology. Product -oriented knowledge
of design, production engineering, fabrication techniques, and end-user
capability provides the basis for enlightened reorientation of procurement
quality assurance elements. Such an approach may yield the mix of pro-





responsibility and satisfy the final user's requirements simultaneously.
It is suggested that inter -service agreement may be reached if
standard procurement quality assurance plans are developed on a commodity
basis and if such plans provide for the selection of techniques and methods
by knowledgeable local field representatives. There is sufficient similarity
among the departments in procurement quality assurance of aircraft, mis-
siles, ammunition, communication, and detection equipment, to name only
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